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Abstract—For the protection of people and society against
harm and health threats — especially for the COVID-19 pan-
demic — a variety of different disciplines needs to be involved.
The data collection of very basic and health-related data of
individuals in today’s highly mobile society does help to plan,
protect, and identify next steps health authorities and govern-
ments can, shall, or need to plan for or even implement. Thus,
every individual, every human, and every inhabitant of the world
is the key player — very different to many past crises’. And since
the individual is involved — all individuals — his/her (a) health
and (b) privacy shall be considered in a very carefully crafted
balance, not overruling one aspect with another one or even
prioritizing certain aspects. Privacy remains the key.
Thus, the solution of the current pandemic’s data collection can
be based on a fully privacy-preserving application, which can be
used by individuals on their mobile devices, such as smartphones,
while maintaining at the same time their privacy. Additionally,
respective data collected in such a fully distributed setting does
help to confine the pandemic and can be achieved in a democratic
and very open, but still and especially privacy-protecting world.
Therefore, the WeTrace approach and application as described
in this paper utilizes the Bluetooth Low Energy (BTE) com-
munication channel, many modern mobile devices offer, where
asymmetric cryptography is being applied to allows for the
deciphering of a message for that destination it had been intended
for. Since literally every other potential participant only listens to
random data, even a brute force attack will not succeed. WeTrace
and its Open Source implementation is the only known approach
so far, which ensures that any receiver of a message knows that
this is for him/her, but does not know who the original sender
was.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social distancing is one of the essential measures to prevent
the spreading of COVID-19 in a population. The current
situation indicates that any step toward the re-establishment
of the societys regular economic activities shall be performed
very carefully by health authorities and governments in order
to prevent a second or new infection waves. Thus, the use
of existing and already rolled-out technology is essential and
almost the only way (a) to crowd-source information con-
cerning the health of individuals and (b) to ensure that social
distancing rules are being respected. These two requirements
stem from the perspective of a general epidemic analysis and
urgently need to be combined with technical support such
that (i) the individuals privacy, (ii) the personal freedom of
an inhabitant of Switzerland and many other countries — in
contrast to a selected list of differently organized countries of
the world —, and (iii) the avoidance of “finger-pointing” to
select humans can be reached technically and efficiently in the
shortest possible time frame.
For instance, the spreading rate of infection based on cur-
rently available data (e.g., in how many days does the number
of infected individuals doubles) may imply that as observed in
some cases in Italy or Spain, it is not possible for individuals
to be examined because the hospital’s infrastructure may be
overloaded. Thus, waiting for a doctor’s signaling that an
individual is infected may be too late to prevent further
infections from that individual. Furthermore, the asymptomatic
period, where individuals are not aware of his/her infections,
can imply that a system may emit distance alerts regardless of
whether a mobile device flagged an unidentified human being
infected is nearby or not.
As of today, most individuals carry such mobile, but dif-
ferent devices with different communication choices being
integrated. These devices include phones – generally termed
smartphones —, tablets, and laptops. Each of them is con-
nected through partially selectable communication technolo-
gies, such as Bluetooth (BT), Bluetooth Low Energy (BTE),
Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11 family of protocols), Wi-Fi direct, GSM
(Global System for Mobile Communications), UMTS (Uni-
versal Mobile Telecommunication System), HSDPA (High-
Speed Downlink Packet Access), LTE (Long-term Evolution),
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or LTE-A (Long-term Evolution Advanced) (often termed 3G,
4G, and partially already moving into 5G technologies). Many
of those alternatives allow for the communication of a mobile
device’s position to nearby devices and even further on.
For this work on WeTrace, the fully privacy-preserving
approach and application, the focus is on BTE, since all 3G to
5G communication technologies deployed already will allow
for an identity tracking of this device used, since the SIM
(Subscriber Identity Module) card-based identification of com-
munications can always reveal the current users (subscriber)
identity, who was registered with the respective contract. Thus,
a clear demand beyond public telecommunication system-
based communications for a full privacy-preserving tracking
and tracing is very urgently required. Note that WeTrace
potentially offers as well a solution to meet major GDPR
(General Data Protection Regulation) requirements, which are
in force in certain European countries.
The WeTrace approach and application developed here
fulfills exactly this key requirement on privacy-preserving for
arbitrary mobile devices, being able to communicate via BTE
and being used by their owners in a once-used, once-associated
manner. This means that the underlying assumption of this
work is — as very many others do that, too, but do not
necessarily state that explicitly: “one mobile device belongs
to one individual and is used by this individual only during
the pandemic”. Furthermore, the application of low-range
BTE communications determines a highly suitable coincidence
between the COVID-19 “social distancing” requirements and
the communications technology: Since only those individuals
in a range of a few meters (if staying that close together for
approximately 10 to 15 minutes) potentially are subject to
contagious infection, their mobile devices can, if the WeTrace
application is enabled and configured, exchange health data
in a fully privacy-protecting manner, such that the infection
status information can be exchanged fully anonymous and in
a secured (encrypted) manner.
Finally, WeTrace as a tracing approach and application will
not deprecate over a very short period of time, since the fully
privacy-preserving characteristic can serve for future health-
related as well as other data collection applications, such as
high-density events in entertainment cases or natural disasters
like earthquakes or tsunamis, where many independent indi-
viduals can report and a respective view on locally residing
individuals can be fed back.
This paper is organized as follows. While Section II summa-
rizes major related work and compares those against the key
dimensions of utmost importance set for a privacy-preserving
tracing application, Section III determines the essential re-
quirements needed to meet the goal of hiding in full the privacy
of an individual participating. Derived from those requirements
the WeTrace approach is introduced in Section IV and relevant
technical details are provided. Section V follows with major
specificities of its technical implementation. While Section VI
discusses first trade-offs taken as well as observations obtained
and analysis performed with respect to proximity, privacy, and
user overhead, it complements second with evaluations on
the communication channel used, attacks mitigated, storage
sizes, and scalability. Thus finally, Section VII summarizes and
concludes the WeTrace work as one essential step into a fully
privacy-preserving tracking and tracing application world.
II. RELATED WORK
Since the formal declaration of COVID-19 being a world-
wide pandemic, progressing at a very fast pace, a set of
different projects and tools have been proposed to implement
automated notification or alerting systems as a supporting tool
to ensure the re-establishment of societys normal activities,
while safely maintaining the human’s health as the primary
goal. Of course, systems for tracking and tracing exist and
various mobile devices show a variety of very different,
but related functionality, including the search option for a
displaced smartphone, once it had been misplaced or stolen.
However, very many if not all such approaches known do
trade-off the individual’s privacy or the human’s data privacy
in one way or another. Thus, the notification or alerting option
of today’s tracking and tracing systems has not reached an
acceptable standard with respect to user privacy and user data
privacy.
Thus, it is highly important, especially with respect to an
application collecting health data, to observe security and
more precisely privacy concerns of all solutions proposed so
far, which address COVID-19 tracing anonymously. Privacy
includes the privacy of the user and the privacy of user data,
here a medical status. Additionally, this includes for sure non-
negotiable guarantees that these systems cannot be used as (a)
attacking tools to the availability of other systems, (b) jeopar-
dizing the privacy of users themselves, (c) violating the privacy
of user data, and (d) revealing at any step performed private
and to be secured personal (health) data. In this sense, Table I
collects the major characteristics of related systems in order
to clarify the state-of-the-art concerning tools and proposals
related to COVID-19-driven tracing and tracking. An extensive
report of further related work collections performed by several
contributors can be found at [1]. A global report on approaches
by governmental and private projects to use personal data to
combat COVID-19 can be found at [2]. However, since this
work here on WeTrace addresses the user privacy and user
data privacy as its first priority, the constructive work to define
and specify an appropriate solution is considered to be more
relevant at this stage than collecting yet another complete view
of country-specific approaches under way these days.
Nevertheless, since the pandemic is very recent and is
spreading in some countries of the world at a very fast pace
(an exponential growth was observed in certain countries,
in many others is had slowed down slowly at the time
of writing [3]), it is important to note that most of these
approaches as referred to above are theoretical proposals or
are still under development. Thus, the detailed information on
these technological solutions and approaches might become
deprecated over a very short period. Clearly, the use of more
general and generic applications will help to sustain the work
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and research invested. As such, the Sismo approach [4] was
proposed for earthquake notifications and now is being used
to operate for COVID-19 notifications.
The key dimensions of the table on related work compiled
here and their detailed description are determined in different
dimensions as follows:
1) Solution: Proposed tool or respective solution, including
its current name(s) and currently available key refer-
ence(s).
2) Open-Source: Determination whether the code is or will
become publicly available. This is essential for a verifi-
cation of the privacy-preserving property of the approach
as well as other security metrics
3) Reporting: Concerning whether users applying this ap-
proach within their smartphone are able to flag them-
selves being in one certain medical state, e.g., “not
infected”, “close contact with infected”, “infected”, “in-
fected, being with symptoms”, “indifferent”, or “healthy”.
There is no “cured” state, as this state is considered as
“not infected”. However, since the actual states are not
important for the WeTrace application’s operation (any
sort of data can be integrated into a message, unless it
grows to large for the Backend to publish), the actual
medical states needed have to be discussed and defined
with epidemiologists.
4) Data Collected: Determining the type of data being
collected and processed, generally that is possible from
the user and/or a Backend (cf. below), if involved. These
data may include Global Positioning System (GPS) data
for geo-localization, timing-related information, medical
status (cf. before), communication addresses, or phone
numbers.
5) Privacy-preserving Mechanism: As it is mandatory that
any solution/tool does not violate the users privacy, e.g.,
by revealing their identity, health conditions, or geograph-
ical localization. A security and risk analysis of this or
these mechanism(s) foreseen or deployed does determine
the level of privacy to be reached.
6) Communication Technology: The technical communica-
tion solution selected enables the collection of relevant (or
irrelevant) information on the users encounters. Mainly
the focus here is on BLE and GPS. Approaches using of
the Wi-Fi communication technology or any 3G to 5G
communication approach is not listed here, since all of
them do limit by definition the users privacy due to the
use of IP (Internet Protocol) addresses or phone numbers,
since Internet Service Providers are required by law in
selected countries to keep track of the “owner” of an IP
address for a certain time and the use of SIM cards legally
requires a registration of users with their full identity,
respectively.
7) User Notification: The key feedback channel back to
the user needs to be identified, especially for any type
of feedback the user may want to know about the data
collected, e.g., graphs, statistics, summaries, or simple
“encounter” information. Depending on the system and
data, such data may be already privacy-protected, thus,
encrypted.
8) Storage: The storage of Data Collected is partially impor-
tant for comparisons, statistics, and trends. Thus, different
approaches are deployed to store data in general or
messages specifically in form of: e.g., local storage, in
the cloud, on private servers, or on individual devices
only. Also, based on the storage approach, Backends (cf.
next) might be required to receive and actively forward
information related to the medical status.
9) Backend: The Backend is important for (a) an exchange
of data between devices, which are geographically not
close (any more due to mobile users), (b) a possible
“comparison” of data broadcast to the Backend, (c) a
pure relaying of messages, or (d) a publication of static
content. Depending on the specific role intended, one can
derive how much power and information the provider of
such a Backend holds. Example instances of these (not
necessarily orthogonal) roles include servers with e.g., a
central database of all medical states, a relay functionality
for messages, a broadcasting function for messages, or a
publishing activity of static content.
III. REQUIREMENTS
Technical requirements of a tracking and tracing application
are explicitly extracted based on COVID-19 pandemic char-
acteristics and are outlined to determine (a) the minimal set
of functionality needed and (b) major system boundaries and
constraints of the WeTrace application, which are defined in
terms of user privacy. The respective design following in later
sections of the paper complies to such requirements. Especially
system boundaries and constraints taken into consideration
need to comply to GDPR regulations and the respective user
data and user privacy.
Despite the main concern with the users’ confidentiality,
as well as the legal aspects to which a mobile application is
submitted, other requirements such as usability, scalability, and
energy efficiency, are also relevant to determine its success in
terms of mass adoption. Thus, simplicity is the key to make
intuitive user interfaces and to avoid unnecessary operations
(e.g., intensive and explicit use of BLE or GPS).
Besides essential requirements for such an application and
its implemented system of being epidemiological sensible and
useful, important soft-requirements exist. Especially in cases
where people utilize a tracing application on a voluntary basis,
the importance of those soft-requirements becomes clear, since
volunteers installing such an application need to be ensured
that such an application does comply to all of the following
ones. Thus, the following list of requirements was identified
as crucial:
• Privacy
• Scalability
• Energy Consumption
• User Overhead
• Legal Compliance
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TABLE I: Tracing Approach and Application Comparisons
Solution OpenSource Reporting Data Collected
Privacy-preserving
Mechanism Applied
Communications
Technology Data Storage Backend
WeTrace Yes Self-reporting GPS location history,encounter timestamp
Public Key Cryptography,
GDPR-compliant privacy,
fully anonymous
BLE Decentralized,locally at the device
Run by either authorities
or trustworthy institutions,
broadcasting of notifications
CoroTrac [5] No Self-reporting GPS location history Data anonymization model GPS Centralized,own database
Infrastructure maintained by
the developer’s institution
CovidWatch [6] Yes Self-reporting GPS location history GPS anonymization model BLE Decentralized,locally at the device
Public database maintained by
the developer’s institution,
broadcasting of notifications
Pandoa [7] Yes Self-reporting GPS location history GPS anonymization model BLE, GPS Centralized,own database
Infrastructure maintained by
the developers, send notifications
for possible contacts
NextTrace [8] No Provided by Labsand self-reporting
Location and
proximity data Data anonymization model BLE, GPS N/A
Infrastructure maintained by
the developers, send notifications
for possible contacts
geoHealthApp [9] No Claimed to beAI-based GPS location history
Blockchain, claimed GDPR
compliant GPS
Centralized,
own database
Infrastructure maintained by
the developers
CoronaTrace [10] No Self-reporting GPS location history
User data anonymization,
not publicly visible
individual information
GPS Centralized,own database
Infrastructure maintained by
the developers, send notifications
for possible contacts
TraceTogether [11] No Self-reporting Location and locationof nearby devices Encrypted BLE channels BLE
Decentralized,
locally at the device
Infrastructure maintained by
the developers, send notifications
for possible contacts
DP3T [12]
part of PEPP-PT [13] Yes Self-reporting
GPS location history,
encounter timestamp
Apply Hash functions,
pseudoanonymous for
research volunteers, GDPR
GPS, Cell phone
triangulation , BLE
Decentralized,
locally at the device
Run by either authorities
or trustworthy institutions,
broadcasting of notifications
NextStep [14]
part of PEPP-PT [13] Partially Self-reporting
Only P2P Bluetooth
encounters Encrypted (not disclosed) BLE
Decentralized,
locally at the device
Full details not disclosed, matching
of IDs all done on device
NOVID20 [15] Yes Self-reporting GPS location history,Bluetooth, and Google Encrypted (not disclosed) BLE, GPS
Decentralized,
locally at the device
Infrastructure maintained by
the developers, send notifications
for possible contacts
StopCorona [16] No Self-Reporting Mobile number for 30 days,Bluetooth, nearby audio
Pseudonymous, collects
user information for
research purposes
Microphone, BLE Centralized
Infrastructure maintained by
the developers, notifications
available publicly
Sismo [4] No Self-reporting GPS current location
Pseudonymous, collects
user information for
research purposes
GPS Centralized,cloud-server
Infrastructure maintained by
the developers institution
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A. Privacy Properties
Moreover, within the general context of privacy, the proper-
ties defined by [17] are taken into consideration for the design
of the WeTrace application, too, which explicitly include:
1) Privacy from Snoopers
2) Privacy from Contacts
3) Privacy from Authorities
These three properties determine three dedicated and po-
tential attack vectors, since any of these three roles listed
potentially could harm the system’s coherent and trustworthy
operation. Thus, they are evaluated in Subsection V-E.
B. Scalability
Within a pandemic setup it is expected that data, i.e., of
new positive cases, can grow exponentially in a very short
amount of time. WeTrace needs to be able to cope with this
exponential growth in order to be useful, when it is needed
the most. Thus, (a) the number of infections, (b) the number
of “close contacts”, and (c) the number of keys determine
relevant parameters impacting WeTrace’s scalability. A fourth
scalability dimension is determined in terms of regions cov-
ered. Without any doubt, achieving an application suitable also
across multiple countries will be inherently more useful. A
selected set of numerical examples related to the scalability of
WeTrace is discussed in Section VI-F.
C. Energy Consumption
Even though the scanning and advertising BLE packages
has a minimal impact on a smartphone’s battery life, compared
to communication alternatives such as ZigBee/802.15.4 [18]),
it is evident that a user that allows the WeTrace application
to run in the background will not perceive the application as
acceptable, if it is draining the battery life of his/her device.
In this sense, it is imperative to be compatible with significant
battery optimization mechanisms available on the Android and
iOS platforms. Hence, the WeTrace implementation has to
consider the impact on battery life with the use of BLE for
tracking close contact encounters [19], [20].
D. User Overhead
The user will have to receive the WeTrace application from
a trusted platform, which means a minimal overhead for all
users to launch and leave it running in the background. Ideally,
the WeTrace protocol can be included into already accepted
and existing apps, so that the user does not need to install any
additional application to ensure his/her privacy. However, if
the WeTrace application is installed separately, the installation
experience needs to be very simple for any user to get started
easily. An approach of such a WeTrace application integration
related to the user overhead minimization is discussed in
Section VI-F.
E. Legal Compliance
The legal compliance with data protection laws and regu-
lations, e.g., the GDPR, is crucial for any technical solution
that collects and analyzes user data [12]. Specifically, Arti-
cle 25 of the European Union (EU) GDPR states that only
personal data, which are necessary for each specific purpose
of the processing, are processed. That obligation applies to
the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their
processing, the period of their storage, and their accessibility
[21]. Thus, any digital tracing solution must respect the legal
requirements, minimizing the data collected and processed.
In case of WeTrace this goal is reached, since as designed
and documented below, it is the user who decides on data
to be shared besides the fact of a “close contact” in a fully
anonymous manner.
According to Article 4(15) of the EU GDPR [22], data
concerning health concerns any personal data related to the
physical or mental health of a natural person, thus, this also ap-
plies to WeTrace. Since, the WeTrace messages are encrypted
with the public key of the Device B, WeTrace assures the
confidentiality of all messages communicated (thus. published)
via the Backend (cf., 2). Hence, negligent parties (e.g., Device
C), cannot decrypt data seen in this message received, since
these messages are encrypted with the public key received via
the “close contact” over a BLE advertisement packet.
IV. WETRACE STAKEHOLDERS AND ARCHITECTURE
Taking the requirements listed in Section III above into
consideration, this section presents the WeTrace application
to address the problem of privacy in tracking of COVID-
19 cases. WeTrace is a fully privacy-preserving solution that
relies on cryptographic mechanisms, such as asymmetric key
pairs, to provide an application, where identities of users are
only known by the user him/herself. Thus, this section details
the stakeholders involved, presents the WeTrace architecture,
and describes the flow of information between all major
components and stakeholders.
A. Stakeholder Definitions
Even though WeTrace consists of a simple approach involv-
ing Users, Devices, and a Backend, there are other relevant
and related stakeholders to be considered. These, including
the main three ones, are described as follows:
• Users are individuals using the WeTrace application, for
which any person can have at this state of th implemen-
tation three possible states: (i) “not infected”, (ii) “close
contact with infected”, or (iii) “infected”. As discussed
above in Section II, the actual states are to be discussed
with epidemiologists.
• Medical Doctor: Currently, the WeTrace application
relies on self-reporting to detect COVID-19 infections,
which might lead to the spam of false-positives. To
address such a problem, a medical doctor does act as
a testing person. However, this could potentially weaken
the privacy of the approach, if doctor-user relations may
become public.
• Governmental Health Agency: Similarly to medical
doctors, governmental health agencies could provide
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trusted data concerning the medical status of an indi-
vidual. However, research on how to maintain privacy
concerning eHealth data must be conducted, as pointed
out by [23], [24]. Thus, the WeTrace application focuses
at this stage of the implementation on those three medical
states as determined above only.
• Devices determine the technical platform on which GPS
and BLE-enabled communications happen and where
WeTrace is installed on. A Device stores the following
information: Master seed used to generate public-private
key pairs, public keys of devices (which have WeTrace in-
stalled) encountered within 2 m of proximity and being in
contact for longer than an epidemiological relevant time
(e.g., 10 to 15 min), a timestamp, and the approximated
geo-location of encounters.
• A Backend broadcasts all messages of users who
changed their status from “not infected” to “infected”.
The Backend does not store any data, only publishes
them to other WeTrace-enabled devices, which perform
the decryption of messages in case of needs.
• The Server Administrator of the Backend must be taken
into consideration as he/she will have access to all mes-
sages originating from WeTrace applications. Although
all messages are encrypted with private keys and the
server does not store any public keys, the server ad-
ministrator has full access of these messages and related
information, e.g., IP addresses and the device platform
that could be used to infer the identity of a user.
• Identity Provider: Even though the identity of the
user is only known within the device (based on the
storage of private keys generated via the master seed),
such devices require outside the use of the WeTrace
application the registration with Communication Service
Providers, e.g., telephony operators, 4G cells and their
Base Stations, or Internet Service Providers (ISP) with
their Wi-Fi networks. Thus, the identity of the device a
user utilizes could be retrieved, if such providers share
this information for a meta analysis.
B. Architecture
Figure 1 depicts the architecture of WeTrace as proposed.
Three devices are shown, Device A, Device B, and Device C.
All three devices have the WeTrace application installed and
are broadcasting their public key.
Whenever these devices see another device that is broad-
casting its public key over BLE, they will store that public
key received in their local storage. Furthermore, all devices
actively poll the latest encrypted messages from the Backend
and try to decrypt them. This connection to the Backend
happens through a general Internet connection, since only
the exchange of public keys happens through BLE. Finally,
encrypted messages are published by all Devices via the Back-
end, which will then make these newly encrypted messages
available for everyone else, thus, all other devices. The third
party hosting the Backend potentially will be able to collect
IP addresses from those communications and devices, which
are publishing encrypted messages. Even though the content
of those messages cannot be read by the third party the fact
that they can be linked to IP addresses can potentially pose a
threat to privacy. To avoid this from happening on that level,
a possible mitigation routes the publishing of messages from
a device through the Tor network.
C. Sequence Diagram
The overall flow of information and interaction between the
main stakeholders of WeTrace is shown in Figure 2. On one
hand, Device A and Device B “see each other” for a long
enough time, such that they decide independently from each
other to store the other party’s public key in their local storage
on the device. On the other hand, Device C is not in reach of
those Devices A and B, hence Device C neither collects public
keys nor advertises the own public key to anyone successfully.
In case a fourth Device D may pop up in proximity to Device
C, the public key advertised by Device C regularly will be
stored by Device D and vice versa.
Under the assumption that Device A decides to report
an infection, it will iterate locally through all the public
keys stored within the local storage and will encrypt the
new message containing the information the user decides to
broadcast with each public key individually, such as at least the
infection status. Among those public keys locally stored there
will also be the public key advertised by Device B previously.
Since Device B will poll from the Backend regularly the
latest messages, it will try to decrypt those ones received.
Thus, Device B will then find out that one message can
be decrypted with his/her own private key, meaning that the
message was intended for this Device B only. At that point in
time the WeTrace application has to inform the user of Device
B that the message was intended for this device and contains
the decrypted information as communicated.
In the meantime, Device C will also poll messages from the
Backend regularly, however, since the his/her public key was
never collected by Device A, none of these messages received
can be decrypted. Hence, Device C will know that no message
was intended for it.
V. TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION
WeTrace is proposed to be operational as an application on
mobile devices, typically a smartphone on iOS or Android
basis. WeTrace deploys mechanisms and technology, which
exists today and has proven to work in many instances, thus,
no newly developed technology will be required. All stake-
holders as defined in Subsection IV-A above are considered
to be operational and in existence. The open-source WeTrace
implementation is available at [25] and serves as the basis all
aspects described in the following.
A. WeTrace Properties
Before WeTrace’s technical assumptions are made explicit
in Subsection V-B below and the respective security and
attack models are outlined in Subsection V-D below, the major
WeTrace application properties are defined as follows:
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Devi ce A Devi ce B Devi ce C
PKA
PKB
cb? EncPKB(message)
Backend
fetch cb and decrypt fetch cb and can not decrypt
Fig. 1: WeTrace Architecture
Devi ce A Devi ce B Devi ce CBackend
PKA
store PKA
store PKB
PKB
sd discover BTE encounter and exchange public keys
sd broadcast infection report
cb? EncPKB(m) 
publish cb
fetch cb
 m? DecSKB(cb)     ? DecSKC(cb)
fetch cb
Fig. 2: WeTrace Sequence Diagrams
• All data of “close contacts” stay only on the mobile
device, these are never shared with a Backend.
• Locally collected “close contacts” (<2 m) are stored
together with the timestamp of when the contact had
happened and an approximate geolocation of where the
contact had happened.
• In case of an “infection report” being received from a
third party, e.g., a doctor or a hospital with which the
owner of the mobile devices had medical interrogations
with, only those users, who had been in close contact
will be notified (cf. Figure 2). The Backend sees those
messages being encrypted, cannot read its content, and
operates with the sole purpose of relaying the message.
• The user, who received a report on an infection or a non-
infection, can decide whether he/she wants to:
1) Report only the infection to the close contacts of
the last 14 days. This value of a constant of the
protocol will be configured within the application upon
deployment and defines a medical consensus defined
by epidemiology.
2) Report the above and the timestamp of when that close
contact had taken place.
3) Report the above and the geolocation of where the
close contact had taken place.
4) Report the above and the timestamp of when that close
contact and the geolocation of where the close contact
had taken place.
By utilizing a suitable combination of BLE protocol features
— available in many mobile devices — and security mecha-
nisms — to be made available via the WeTrace application —
in addition, these concepts in conjunction define the underlying
system’s architecture.
B. Underlying Technical Assumptions
The device in used for the WeTrace application is assumed
to be trusted, since the secret key (used as the master seed
to derive multiple public keys) is managed by the Operating
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System (OS) (e.g., Android or iOS) and stored at the Secure
Enclaves provided by the mobile OS. Furthermore, the general
assumptions applying to asymmetric cryptography also apply
to WeTrace, since public-key cryptosystems rely on the hard-
ness of factoring discrete logarithms [26]. Additionally, trust
in the integrity of the GPS location and timestamp is also
assumed, since it is generated by the underlying OS, using
respective sensors of the smartphone. The underlying com-
munication protocol BLE and especially the BLE Advertising
Packets [27] are deployed for exchanging close encounters
are applied. Considering the WeTrace architectural depicted
in Figure 1, the following assumptions are listed:
• The Device is assumed to be trusted, because secret
keys must remain private, and, thus, data generated and
broadcasted is trustworthy.
• The Backend is assumed not to be trusted concerning
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Therefore, de-
vices are required to encrypt any message, including
notification messages, with the public key of devices
that had been received in close proximity over a defined
period of time. Therefore, a interaction scheme is applied,
where public keys are exchanged regularly, while the
devices are near and reachable via BLE.
• The Communication Channel is provided by BLE’s
advertisements, which are assumed not to be trusted.
Thus, a service provider cannot assure the availability
of the service, i.e., messages can fail to be delivered, and
their content is readable from anyone receiving the mes-
sage if not an explicitly encrypted payload is maintained.
While this reflects the communication channel among de-
vices BLE, the Device-to-Backend communication chan-
nel uses the Internet and is assumed to be not trusted
as well. In the same way message content is readable
from anyone receiving the message if not an explicitly
encrypted payload is maintained. Furthermore, revealing
of an identify of that device running this communications
may be possible with external meta-data from the service
provider, such as IP addresses or phone numbers. This
is mitigated by applying the sending of messages to the
backend via the tor network.
C. WeTrace Application Operation — Example
The WeTrace application’s operation is exemplified within
a given use case. Thus, for this example User A with Device
A, User B with Device B, and User C with Device C are
considered.
1) Every device that installs the WeTrace app generates an
asymmetric key pair using elliptic curve cryptography.
For this examples PKA stands for the public key of
Device A and SKA stands for the secret key of Device A.
Thus, this step generated PKA, PKB , PKC , and SKA,
SKB , SKC , respectively.
2) In turn, every device starts broadcasting their PK∗, which
is also considered to be their unique identifier to its
surrounding devices.
3) Upon devices (i.e., A and B) now getting into “close
contact” with User A, the Device A get to know PKB
and the Device B gets to know PKA via the exchange
of these over the BLE protocol. Besides these pubic
keys PK∗, both devices also store a timestamp and the
approximate geolocation of where this encounter had
happened. Generally, this contact information is collected
for all other devices in close proximity, too.
4) Upon User A’s information received, e.g., from a doctor
or a hospital with which the owner of the device had
medical interrogations with, User A wants to report an
“infection” or a “non-infected” status. Thus, the Device
A will go through the list of close contacts collected as
within step 3 and encrypts one message each for every
public key of close contacts. In case of User A, it will
be encrypted once with PKB , because this was the only
contact. All those messages will be sent to the Backend
via a different than BLE communication channel. The
Backend will relay these messages to all devices. The
messages will contain the data that User A chose to share,
so either only the fact that an infection happened or not,
or additionally when or even where it happened. As noted
above, it is important that only the reporting user decides
if he/she wants to share this additional information.
5) Device B and Device C now receive from the Backend a
notification telling them that new reports have been seen.
Thus, Device B will then try to decrypt every message
already recorded at the step 3, the close encounter, with
SKB and will eventually find out that a message was
directed at him/her, thus, indicating to User B the status
User A now knows and reported. Device C will do
perform exactly the same steps, however, because no
message in his/her local storage was encrypted with
PKC , no message can be decrypted, thus, no information
is relayed to User C.
While this example indicates clearly how the use of public-
private cryptography mechanisms ensures the generation of an
unrecorded — thus, no individual identity being assigned to a
public-private key pair — identity, which is temporary for the
life-time of the application. A new installation will generate a
new public-private key pair. The example shows as well that
the Backend does not maintain the content nor any data, even if
it would do so, run as a possible attack, the content will remain
encrypted and unusable, since no proximity information would
be available to that server.
D. Security and Attack Model
The WeTrace design does consider a wider spectrum of po-
tential vulnerabilities and includes respective countermeasures.
Therefore, to provide the technical means necessary to ensure
user privacy and user data privacy, it is mandatory (a) to ensure
that at least one Backend is available to broadcast notifications
to others and (b) to ensure the integrity of these notifications
sent by Devices with a minimal Backend interaction. Further-
more, the WeTrace Backend (as outlined above in Figure 1) is
assumed not to be trusted as such. Therefore, with respect to
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TABLE II: CIA Analysis of the Backend and Devices
CIA Backend Devices
Confidentiality Does not provideguarantees 7
Notifications are encrypted
with PK of previously in
range devices
3
Integrity
Does not provide
guarantees on the delivery
of notifications
7
Does not provide
integrity guarantees
of notifications
7
Availability
Backend can fail or
be a target of DDoS
attacks
7
Not ensured that neither
the sending or
receiving devices would
be available.
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confidentiality, integrity, and availability the Table II discusses
those characteristics for WeTrace Devices and the Backend.
1) Adversary Model: WeTrace assumes an adversary model
with malicious users, which can potentially cause a DoS
(Denial-of-Service) or, in case of multiple malicious users, a
DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attack. Also, there are
no trust guarantees on the Backend concerning Confidentiality,
Integrity, and Availability (CIA) (Table II).
2) DDoS on the Backend: A device may intentionally or
unintentionally cause a DoS on the server by sending multiple
requests to notify a list of devices previously in range. Addi-
tionally, a DDoS can happen with multiple devices performing
the same operation. Furthermore, the same concern should be
considered to prevent one or multiple servers to flood one
or multiple devices. Therefore, the notification schema should
be carefully designed to prevent flooding of messages on
both sides (backend/application). Furthermore, such an attack
scenario is mitigated by a combination of two mechanisms: (i)
by adding an anonymous authentication when publishing data
to the Backend, such as via a dedicated token only hospitals
may use or by applying a proof-of-work activity and (ii) by
limiting the size of the message a single device can report
to a sensible maximum value, such as that a device can only
contact 1,000 users at most.
3) Impersonification of the Backend: Malicious users may
try to impersonate the server in order to intercept the connec-
tion of multiple devices to the Backend. Thus, it is important
to use a secure communication channel with the Backend to
prevent malicious devices from acting as man-in-the-middle.
4) False Notification Reporting: It is also important to pre-
vent users from issuing false notifications, either maliciously
or unintentionally. Thus, it is necessary to ensure that the ap-
plication issues a confirmation page/button before changing a
status and also (and not less critical) prevent multiple changes
of status over a period of time. Although it had not yet been
confirmed, but so far there are only very few cases of multiple
COVID-19 infections on the same individual, thus, there does
not seem to exist a reason to allow a device to change its status
to infected or not healthy twice or more often. Thus, it is highly
relevant to foresee such a warning/confirmation page/button.
Furthermore, the Backend should prevent the situation, where
multiple individual notifications are sent to a recipient device
in multiple copies. Therefore, the mitigation measure will
follow the basics in terms of DDoS mitigation as described
above: the anonymous authentication when publishing data to
the Backend prevents such falsified notification reports.
E. Privacy Enforcements
The enforcement of those privacy properties as set-up in
Subsection III-A is key and addressed in the following way.
1) Privacy from Snoopers: Since WeTrace will broadcast
a signal on “close contacts” based on public keys generated
(cf. Figure 2) so that others in close proximity can detect and
possibly register such a contact anonymously, snoopers will
also be able to see all public keys being advertised. However,
since those public key-based identities will be valid only for a
very limited time (those can be further shortened if needed),
the user will not be more exposed to snooping than he/she
already is with a Wi-Fi-enabled device that is broadcasting its
MAC (Medium Access Control) address without any consent
or knowledge of the user. This is still happening in case MAC
randomization is enabled.
Also, only if the snooper was in real close contact, he/she
will receive a notification of infection, but will not be able to
track down from which user this notification was sent. That is
due to the fact that for the notification it does not matter which
information the snooper collects, but only which information
the user devices collect and acknowledge as a close contact.
Thus, this property is covered in an almost perfect manner by
WeTrace.
2) Privacy from Contacts: Privacy from contacts is ad-
dressed in a similar argument as for the case of “Privacy
from Snoopers”. Close contacts will receive a notification, if a
user chooses to broadcast his/her infection status. However, all
close contacts without exceptions will not know from whom
this message originated. A single case, where this could be
inferred, would be where the user only had close contact with
a single contact during the last 14 days and that contact would
broadcast this information. While this is clearly not impossible
to happen, its likelihood is very small, thus, WeTrace covers
in the large majority of realistic cases this property, too.
3) Privacy from Authorities: Due to the fact that only
encrypted messages are sent to the Backend (cf., Subsec-
tion IV-A), it does not have access to any personal user data
from any of these messages relayed. Thus, communications
from or to the Backend does not reveal, e.g., the number of
infections or the identifiers of any recipient. The Backend only
knows that someone wants to inform about a medical status,
hence the existence of related communications only reveals
that “at least 1 medical status update had happened”.
Additionally, if WeTrace would introduce random messages,
any third party, such as an attacker or any authority, will not
even know about such a medical status change. Therefore, this
property is achieved by WeTrace as well.
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F. WeTrace Attack Vectors and Other Mitigations
The basic WeTrace Architecture and its stakeholders in-
volvement does potentially give raise to concerns, which
had been identified as weaknesses or attack vectors, but are
addressed also directly with suitable mitigation means. While
two security-related aspects include possible attacks against
the privacy requirement (a malicious scanning of advertise-
ments sent of arbitrary devices and active message injections in
combination with eavesdropping), the respective countermea-
sures are introduced below. A BLE-related protocol concern
exists with respect to its limitations of broadcast messages,
such that at worst public keys could not be broadcast, thus, a
suitable operation is defined to circumvent this problem. And
finally, performance concerns may raise with respect to the
scalability of message decryptions, especially in case of many
close encounters.
1) Malicious Scanning of Advertisements: A remaining
privacy concern is due to the fact that a malicious user or
attacked could start tracking a users’ location by scanning
his/her advertising packets. This can potentially happen, if the
attacker is in the proximity of the user under attack. However,
this case does not occur in reality, since within step 1 as
above, the device’s generation of a key pair is in fact the
generation of a so called “master seed”. This master seed is
used to deterministically derive in turn an unlimited number
of key pairs. This is designed in a way that the user will be
changing the key in a specified period of time (for instance
every e.g., 30 min), making him/her traceable with that public
key for that time frame only. Thus, the local knowledge of
this device’s validity period and the storage of the respectively
applied key pair remain at the discretion of the user’s device
only and is fully decentralized. This leads to the situation that
even a maliciously collecting Backend would possibly collect
“different” public keys, which cannot be mapped onto a single
device by any means.
The major advantage of this approach is — besides its
elegance of hiding temporary identities even further very
efficiently — that the user still only stores one master seed
and derives upon the reception of a notification from the
Backend all asymmetric key pairs used during the past 14
days. Using those derived key pairs the device tries to decrypt
the message by iterating over those keys. This does only
require the storage of master seed only, since the dynamic
derivation of all keys generated is time-wise not costly, but
saves valuable storage. However, the implementation of the
alternative, storing all keys generated over a 14 days period
can improve the decryption time at the cost of a higher local
key storage size.
2) Message Injections and Eavesdropping: In the approach
developed the risk of an attacker injecting packages and mes-
sages instead of eavesdropping exists. Thus the risk evaluation
deals with the question, whether that is better or worse for a
snooper.
On one hand, selected tracing applications and proposals
are today still prone to eavesdropping i.e., PEPP-PT (Pan-
European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing). Eavesdrop-
ping refers to the fact that an attacker passively listens to
all communications going on, which requires in case of
BLE communications to be in close proximity or to install
maliciously a BLE-based Backend, which collects all local
communications to forward it to the attacker’s infrastructure
for analysis — none can be prevented from happening. On
the other hand, tracing applications and proposals are today
still prone to message injections i.e., WeTrace here. The major
commonalities and differences are summarized as follows:
• All unauthorized listening and eavesdropping is unde-
tectable in the general case.
• Message injection is in general difficult or even impracti-
cal if these messages are “directed at someone” explicitly.
Thus, only an approach, which can prevent message injec-
tion, while being prone against eavesdropping, can survive a
security analysis. For WeTrace that means: In order to know,
if User A was infected, the attacker would need to ensure that
User A only receives the message injected, since if multiple
other users would also receive that message, the attacker would
not be able to distinguish anymore from whom the message
was received.
Furthermore, if the attacker relies on the fact that the
“reporting” party needs to record his details, that party has
control over “when” to record the attacker as a “close contact”
— that party can define, e.g., how high the signal level needs
to be or how long the contact needs to last.
Finally, for the eavesdropper’s scenario the attacker would
just collect as much as possible and the other party has no
control over what is being recorded or not. However, these data
collected are of no use for the attacker, since the temporary
identities change over time frequently and cannot be associated
under any measure reliably with a device, thus, a user.
3) Limitations of BLE Broadcast: The BLE protocol is
limited with respect to how many bytes can be broadcast
while in background operation, thus, the major concern is,
does public key fit into a BLE broadcast?
WeTrace requires for a secure encryption at least 24 Byte for
the public key, ideally it would above 32 Byte. While the BLE
advertisement message is limited with respect to the number
of bytes being included as a payload, solutions exist to work
around this limitation, even if the payload would be limited
to only 16 Byte. The following options exist:
• Do not broadcast the entire public key. In this option
only the first n bytes (n being the number of bytes to
be included into the payload) are broadcast. Afterwards,
the remaining 32-n bytes are published to a server, for
instance as a map that uses as the lookup key the hash
of the first n bytes. This will allow for the operation
with an infinite size of keys, since only those devices
that had been able to collect these n bytes will be able to
request the remaining bytes. Thus, the authority running
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the server will not know by any chance the full public
key, but only 32-n bytes.
• Use multiple advertisement packets with an n bytes pay-
load. Since a possible contact counts as a “close contact”
only after a certain amount of time, it is clear that a device
has to collect at least 2 separate advertisement packets
to be able to define that duration. Thus, it is viable for
WeTrace to split up the key into multiple advertisement
packets.
• Advertise only a fixed service Universally Unique Iden-
tifier (UUID). An UUID allow others, users and devices,
to request the characteristics of that service. In this case,
the characteristics are determined by those 32 Byte.
4) Scalability of Message Decryption: The WeTrace ap-
proach and protocol outlined requires a user to decrypt all
messages to understand (being able to correctly interpret the
content of an initially encrypted message), if a message was
directed at him/her. While this scales reasonably well as long
as the user has to decrypt up to 1 million messages, it might
become a problem with larger numbers, especially because
the drainage of the users’ device battery with decryption
tasks needs to be avoided. However, under the assumption
of COVID-19 curfews as well as lockdowns, the likelihood
that mobile devices are recharged more often is large due to
having fixed power supplies.
A suitable path to mitigate this performance aspect without
the considerations of more frequent recharging options is by
prefixing the message with the first n bytes of the hash of
the public key. This would allow the user to select at first
and reduce drastically at second the number of messages
he/she needs to decrypt. Such an approach will basically
allow a device to cope with almost any reasonable number
of encrypted messages in those cases of hundreds, now even
thousands of close encounters.
VI. OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS
The WeTrace approach and application — as it had been
designed — suits its needs. The details of these are first
discussed and secondly evaluated from the perspective of
advantages over other related work and drawbacks compared
to related work — including already their mitigation means
— as of below. While major conclusions are drawn, too,
it is essential to observe, which trade-offs have been taken
into account and how next steps for tracking and tracing
applications in case of a pandemic are foreseen.
A. Trade-offs
Unfortunately, there are many trade-offs to consider. In the
theoretical view of the design WeTrace follows, it trades off
(a) a central analysis versus (b) the privacy of users and user
data. While it is obvious that a central analysis of data can be
advantageous, once authorities for instance want (i) to detect
“hot spots” of infections or (ii) to perform page ranks on
possible next infections, such data being processed will have to
be stored either centrally or locally, while for the latter access
to authorities have to be guaranteed, too. Thus, authorities in
case of (a) will know much more on the participating users’
behavior than necessary.
In essence, this additional information is for the successful
analysis, prediction, and action plan development of COVID-
19 cases not needed, since the measure of “proximity” is based
on the evaluation of epidemiological requirements fully suffi-
cient. As noted above, on an individual basis and designed as
an opt-in approach, individuals may add location information
and time, too. In case of large cities, this is very unlikely to
impact the user’s privacy, in case of rural locations, where
only a few dozens of inhabitants reside, such decisions may
be considered to be more critical with respect to the privacy
aspect, however, it was clearly stated to be an option, thus,
freely made available data does not violate privacy regulations.
B. Proximity Discussion
Furthermore, a key requirement in WeTrace is that the
application has to see both devices needing to record one-
another, the proximity. This is only and solely based on the
use of public-private cryptography, for which such key pairs
may be generated on the spot, since there is no need to register
these key pairs at a Certification Authority due to the fact
that not the individual’s identity is the key, but the fact that
two individuals exchange the proximity information at first
and may exchange later infection status without revealing any
identity for that second step, only the public key once collected
at the close encounter. Thus, this approach enables WeTrace
to encrypt the message for a possible receiver or receivers of
the encrypted report and does fulfill the trade-offs as of (b).
A symmetric encryption scheme, obliviously, will not work,
and the full independence of any centralized authorities does
establish an exchange model of status information on an ad-
hoc basis without any centralized control.
The proximity requirement is met, because WeTrace defines
a close contact as an individual being in a distance of 2 m
of proximity to a COVID-19 infected person and for an
epidemiologically relevant period of 10 to 15 minutes. These
parameters are in accordance with several standards defined by
major health organizations worldwide. For example, the US
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) defined
“close contact” as “...being within approximately 6 feet (2
metres) of a COVID-19 case for a prolonged period of
time” [28], the European CDC defines as “...having had face-
to-face contact with a COVID-19 case within 2 metres and
more than 15 minutes” [29], the New South Wales Ministry
of Health defines as “...greater than 15 minutes face-to-face
contact in any setting with a confirmed case in the period
extending from 24 hours before the onset of symptoms in the
confirmed case...” [30], and the Brazilian Ministry of Health
defines as “A person who has had face-to-face contact for 15
minutes or more and at a distance of less than 2 meters” [31].
Thus, WeTrace’s major parameters are aligned with major
guidelines of the “close contact” definition worldwide.
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C. Privacy Discussion
Concerning the privacy requirements listed in Section III-A,
the WeTrace approach and application addresses all the im-
posed privacy requirements and challenges highlighted in [17].
Hence, the approach tackles the following privacy aspects:
• Privacy from Snoopers: WeTrace addresses this chal-
lenge by limiting the time-wise validity of public and
private key pairs, generating a new one every X minutes.
Furthermore, the snooper is not aware of the device’s
exact location nor its identification, the snooper is only
aware of the notification that a close contact with an
unknown infected individual took place.
• Privacy from Contacts: This property is tackled by
encrypting the message with the public key from “close
contact” devices. Thus, an individual will know that
“infection” messages were sent to him/her, but not who
sent them, since the Backend and the application does
not store any private information.
• Privacy from Authorities: Similarly, with the employ-
ment of public-key encryption, all messages exchanged
between the Backend and all devices are encrypted. They
are only decrypted with the knowledge of the private
key, which remains solely in the user’s device. Thus,
authorities cannot have access to the messages’ content.
• Infrastructure Requirements: WeTrace requires a single
Backend with a straightforward message broadcasting
application. Even though a logically single server is
required, multiple instances of such Backend can exist
to increase their availability.
D. User Overhead Discussion
The WeTrace application resides as of today in a separate
prototypical implementation, thus, the question on how to
integrate this important privacy-preserving functionality into
tracking and tracing apps, which focus on those layers needs
to be answered.
For example, the WHO’s app (World Health Organiza-
tion) as an “e-Library of Evidence for Nutrition Actions
(eLENA)” [32] could place one example for such an integra-
tion. The WHO Zika App [33] as of Google Play can serve
as a second one, once it is turned into a COVID-19 app. On
one hand, any integration would need to carefully consider
technical constraints, on the other hand, only applications,
which do not require user credentials are suitable, since
otherwise privacy may suffer and could be at risk. Thus,
the WeTrace application will have to be offered as an SDK
(Software Development Kit), which makes it much easier for
any other application to integrate WeTrace.
E. Major Observations
Overall, the tradeoffs and discussions highlighted indicate
the key aspects of a system in which very many individual
participants act as in one role (inhabitants) and only very few
act in the second role (authority). Thus, the WeTrace design
decision taken does enable the two roles to act as they are
required to act, independently, however based on each other,
and the method implemented shows all properties in which
the privacy requirement of the proposed solution is integrated
very elegantly and easy to implement.
Of course, the important next step will be that the “com-
munity” of major players and stakeholders can agrees on a
“standard” on how to trace infections in case of COVID-19 and
then to ensure that all developers will use the same standard or
protocol such that the system can profit from a network effect
across different applications, regions, and even countries. It is
imperative that this initiative, to which WeTrace as well as
many other applications need to be counted to, is following a
open source philosophy, so that (i) security-related measures
can be verified openly, (ii) functionality verification can be
performed at no risk, (iii) various application developers can
cooperate, and (iv) all stakeholders involved can collect those
data, which are essential and securely collectable.
F. Evaluations
The investigation of related work in tracking and tracing
applications on the case of COVID-19 did reveal that the
problem is not the collection of data as such, typically provided
by accessing mobile devices such as smartphones, which are in
the possession of an individual, but the guarantee that those
data collected are fully maintaining the basis and all of the
relevant details of a privacy-protected approach. Thus, the
human individual and his/her privacy, his/her private data, and
a fully anonymous processing of related data is the key to
meet European and many other countries demands, while at
the same time being compliant especially with the European
regulation, especially GDPR.
1) Communication Channel Evaluation: Thus, the WeTrace
approach as described above utilizes the Bluetooth communi-
cation channel, which many modern mobile devices provide
today. This coincides with the low range requirements of
the medical dimension, since infections potentially can only
happen in case of close proximity where humans need to stay
within below 2 m for approximately 10 to 15 minutes.
The pure knowledge of such proximity determines the
most essential information for epidemiologists, since based on
density-related information, not necessarily including the exact
geographical location, but a region only, prediction models of
spreading rates or relaxing measures can be derived. However,
since proximity and location determine a highly valuable good
for every single person and individual on earth, it need to
be fully protected from possible misuse or unintended use.
Just imagine the value of a human’s geographical position for
marketing, commercial services, or monitoring? This threat for
an open society has to be balanced with the medical and health
threats COVID-19 imposes on the society. WeTrace allows for
both to be reached and maintained at a highly secured level
of operation.
Furthermore, the WeTrace application requires between 24
and 32 Byte to be transmitted via the BLE communication
channel. Unfortunately, that is technically limited in case
of iOS-based devices, since two advertisement packets are
required here. However, firstly, this “loss” of a single packet
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approach is not crucial to the game, since WeTrace requires the
reception of two advertisement packages always to measure
the time a possible “close contact” had taken. Thus, the poten-
tial limitation to technically one message only does not harm
at all. Secondly, the very strong privacy-preserving approach
adds dedicated overhead to the approach, since a human
associated with a smartphone can consider himself/herself
“infected” or “uninfected” only, once all relevant data had
been decrypted, which causes potentially in the general case
a higher compute burden. However, this drawback can be
mitigated already by adding the first few bits of the relevant
public key into the message being communicated, such that
only those messages need to be decrypted, which provide a
partial match to the owner’s public key.
2) Privacy and Attack Evaluations: The application of
the well-known asymmetric cryptography only allows for the
deciphering of a message at that destination it had been in-
tended for, since that human operating that mobile device may
remember his/her private part of the keys. And all proximity-
related messages are sent in an encrypted manner over BT
in a low range setting. Since additionally literally every other
potential participant only listens to random data, even a brute
force attack will not succeed to decrypt messages reliably on
the fly. Therefore, WeTrace is the only known approach so
far, which ensures that any receiver of a message knows that
this is for him/her, but does not know who the original sender
was.
Furthermore, the users deploying WeTrace are offered an
opt-in path to decide, whether they want to add to the
proximity message additional information, such as the exact
location (not only a region) and the time. Thus, the application
does operate in an open source manner only on the very
basic and privacy-protected data needed to crowd-source data
to help COVID-19 countermeasures to be based on currently
measured details.
While this is considered to be a clear advantage, even
further relevant attacks are mitigated. A passive collection of
communications in such a certain physical near range will
not provide any reasonable amount of information, which
could be used to reveal the sender’s identity. Although as
outlined above, potentially the injection of public keys is
possible in any setting, it can only happen if and only if the
attacker is “local” for a certain amount of time. Thus, the
WeTrace approach developed does not suffer from this attack,
since it alone, the application, does configure and decide on
the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) and the time.
Therefore, eavesdropping does not show any negative impacts.
Finally, the WeTrace application addresses all challenges
that have been highlighted in [17]. This means that the
WeTrace application complies with all imposed privacy re-
quirements and especially with the respective general demand
and key detailed requirements.
3) Data Storage and Size-related Evaluations: Since the
Backend just stores all encrypted messages of the last 14 days,
it offers these to whoever requests them. Overall, this is static
and random data which needs storage space.
Concerning especially the data stored on the client side
(i.e., the smartphone) WeTrace safely assumes an individual
encounters with 5,000 other smartphones in 14 days as close
contacts (i.e., ≤ 2 m every 4 min) and changing the key every
15 min. Furthermore, assuming a 4 Byte size for longitude,
4 Byte for latitude, and a 4 Byte length for the timestamp, an
encounter message will have the size of 12 Byte. Considering
that 4 new keys are generated every hour for 24 hours and
14 days, an individual will own 1.344 private keys gener-
ated and 5.000 encounter messages stored. Thus, the device,
will need to decrypt 6.720.000 messages (i.e., approximately
equaling 80 MByte of data considering the 12 Byte-sized
message). For todays phones this is not considered to be a large
number, due to an average of 80 GByte of storage capacity
per smartphone [34]. It should be noted as well that this is
already an extreme example and it is unlikely to happen in
daily operations. Thus, the client’s side performance is not a
critical aspect within the WeTrace application.
4) Scalability Evaluations: The overall scalability of We-
Trace depends on set of factors: (a) the number of infections,
(b) the number of close contacts, and (c) the number of keys.
Thus, if these numbers grow also the product grows. Currently,
a smartphone is able to decrypt approximately 1 million
messages within seconds, which is acceptable. However, if
these numbers grow in the scale of billions, the scalability
has to be mitigated: every message is prefixed with n bits
of the public key. By doing this, the device will only try to
decrypt those messages, which match with the first n bits of
their public key. This straightforward and easy to implement
scaling strategy allows for an exponentially cut down of the
number of messages to be decrypted. I.e., if a 1 bit prefix
is assumed, the reduction of decryption sets is at 50%, with
a 2 bit prefix 75% are achieved. However, the prefix should
remain at an overall size, where the number of bits being
disclosed does not reveal too much about the actual public
key.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The protection of people and society against harm and
health threats involves a variety of different disciplines. While
in case of the COVID-19 pandemic, the virus and its medical
treatment – from currently effected patients to the vaccination
of future people – do see a major focus of research and
work, the data collection of very basic and health-related data
of individuals in today’s highly mobile society does help to
plan, protect, and identify next steps health authorities and
governments can, shall, or need to plan for or even implement.
Thus, every individual, every human, and every inhabitant of
the world is the key player – very different to many past
crises’.
Although the involvement of all humans cannot be consid-
ered to be negative as such, the individual’s (a) health and
(b) privacy shall be considered in a very carefully crafted
balance, not overruling one with another or prioritizing one
aspect. If the solution of the current pandemic’s data collection
can be based on a fully privacy-preserving application, which
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can be used by individuals on their mobile devices, such as
smartphones, while maintaining at the same time their privacy
and while respective data collected in such a fully distributed
setting does help to confine the pandemic, an important step
forward can be achieved in a democratic and very open, but
still and especially privacy-protecting world.
Thus, the WeTrace approach as described in this paper
utilizes the Bluetooth communication channel, many modern
mobile devices provide in a way, where asymmetric cryptogra-
phy being applied only allows for the deciphering of a message
for that destination it had been intended for. Since literally
every other potential participant only listens to random data,
even a brute force attack will not succeed. WeTrace is the only
known approach so far, which ensures that any receiver of a
message knows that this is for him/her, but does not know
who the original sender was.
Besides this clear advantage, even a passive collection of
communications in a certain physical range will not provide
any reasonable amount of information, which could be used to
reveal the sender’s identity. Although potentially, the injection
of public keys may be possible, if and only if the attacker is
“local” for a certain amount of time, the approach developed
does not suffer from this attack, since it alone does configure
and decide on the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RRSI)
and the time. Therefore, eavesdropping does not show any
negative impacts.
Finally, as a slight drawback of this very strong privacy-
preserving approach is only the overhead to determine, if a
human associated with a smartphone can consider himself/her-
self “infected”, since all relevant data needs to be decrypted.
However, this can be mitigated already by adding the first few
bits of the relevant public key into a message communicated,
such that only those messages need to be decrypted, which
provide a match to the owner’s public key.
In conclusion, the WeTrace application provided in close
relation to those requirements being defined and evaluated
a highly suitable system based on the BTE communication
channel in support of crowd-sourcing for COVID-19-relevant
data in a privacy-protecting setting. This approach is scalable
as well since close proximity of humans can be considered in
the range of a few hundreds of people, not thousands anymore,
since these are legally forbidden. Therefore, in case a mobile
device would see way too many messages, a possible alarm
can be raised, which by itself already identifies that a violation
of meeting regulations had occurred.
In the same line of arguments, the resource consumption of
mobile devices is not at stake, since especially data to be stored
is limited to the public keys of those messages received. While
the overhead on the compute side had already been mentioned,
and it is considered to be at the lower end of the spectrum,
the legal compliance with especially privacy considerations of
users and humans have been met in full.
Note that full-fledged performance evaluation of this ap-
proach and the WeTrace application has not been performed.
However, the open-source implementation is available at [25]
and related soft-requirements’ suitability of thresholds not
reached in practice have been discussed above.
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